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Rural residential development could have a positive or negative effect on the supply 
of ecosystem services. In most cases, the effect tends to be negative. One way of 
managing the impact is through a market based instrument. In this paper we present a 
development offset MBI as a way of cost effectively managing the ecosystem service 
impact of development in the Murrindindi Shire, Victoria. In this paper we note that 
design of the instrument is critical to the success of any MBI, including development 
offsets. Key development offset design issues discussed in this paper include defining 
what is traded (the metric), facilitating trades in a thin marketplace with high 
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Many regions across Australia are experiencing a rapid rate of land use change. A key 
driver of change in the neighbourhood of many Australian cities is the demand for 
rural residences and lifestyle farming opportunities. This is commonly called rural 
residential development (RRD).  It is widely acknowledged that rural residential land 
use change can have a significant impact on the provision of ecosystem services – this 
impact can be positive or negative (The Australian Industry Commission 1998; 
Archer 1977; LaGro Jnr 1996; Tyser and Worley 1992 and Maetas et al. 2003). It is 
generally agreed that RRD will have a negative impact on at least some ecosystem 
services and a benign or slightly beneficial impact on others.      
 
One particular region experiencing rapid RRD is the Murrindindi Shire, located in the 
upper foothills of the Goulburn Broken Catchment of Victoria, Australia. With 
historical land management already causing a reduction in ecosystem service supply 
and the predicted ecosystem service pressures from RRD, the local authorities (The 
Murrindindi Shire Council (MSC) and the Goulburn Broken Catchment Management 
Authority (GBCMA)) have begun to intervene in an effort to bring about better land 
management and ecosystem service supply. In doing this, the local authorities have 
set targets for the provision of higher than current ecosystem services to be achieved 
by both developers and non-developers across the region. 
 
Pursuing ecosystem service targets could be conducted in a number of ways. A 
development offset market-based instrument (MBI) is the approach explored in this 
paper. MBI’s applied in a natural resource management context have received 
increasing attention recently. This is because, in the right circumstances and when 
designed correctly, they have the potential to deliver outcomes at lower cost to 
government and with improved flexibility and lower compliance costs to landholders 
than comparable command and control regulatory instruments.  
 
In general, development offsets require targets or minimum standards to be met but 
allow flexibility with how this is done. Development offsets were proposed for 
investigation in the Murrindindi Shire because it was recognised that the differences 
between landholders (land types, management practises etc) means that costs to reach 
standards would vary. Requiring all landholders to meet the targets in the same way 
and always on site is likely to be significantly more costly than allowing landholders 
the flexibility to achieve targets offsite or through a third party. Significant to 
achieving efficiency gains is the design of the development offset. The development 
offset design issues, as they relate to the Murrindindi case is the focus of this paper.   
 
In section 2 the background to the Murrindindi case study area is described, here we 
outline the nature of RRD, the ecosystem services important to the region and the 
impact of RRD on these services. The conceptual framework, including a discussion 
on why ecosystem services are undersupplied in the current operating environment, is 
provided in section 3. The justification for government intervention is also set out in 
section 3. Here the ecosystem service targets set by the GBCMA are outlined and we 
argue why these targets will not be achieved with current management arrangements. 
In section 4, MBIs and development offsets particularly are introduced as a potential 
tool to facilitate developers achieving the ecosystem service gap. Key issues in the 
design of the development offset are discussed in section 5 and conclusions and 
policy implications are presented in section 6.  
2. Background 
2.1 The Murrindindi Shire  
The Murrindindi Shire is located in Victoria’s upper Goulburn Broken Catchment 
(GBC) (Figure 1), approximately two hours drive north of Melbourne.  
 
Figure 1: The Goulburn Broken Catchment and the Murrindindi Shire 
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Source: Victorian State Government Department of Primary Industries LandLearn education program 
 
Whilst the Murrindindi region developed around broadscale and intensive agriculture, 
its close proximity to Melbourne is now seeing a high demand for rural residential 
living. In 2001 the number of households in the Shire was projected to increase at a 
rate of about 60% per year over the period 2001 to 2021 (Habitat Planning 2003). 
Such an increase in households will inevitable bring an increasing demand for houses 
of which a large proportion of these will be rural residential.  
 
2.2 Ecosystem services and rural residential development 
One major attractor of rural residential development to the Murrindindi Shire is the 
natural environment and its supply of ecosystem services.  An ‘ecosystem’ is 
commonly defined as the interactions among and between species and their 
surrounding environments (Binning et al. 2001). Ecosystems provide many services 
from which humans benefit. Ecosystem services contribute to the economic and social 
wellbeing to human beings in two key ways (Binning et al. 2001): 1.  Through the use of natural resources (derived from natural assets) they 
provide an input to the production of a good; and 
2.  By maintaining natural assets through two different pathways. One, by 
regenerating the natural assets. Two, through the assimilation of by-products 
arising from production processes or from consumption of goods. 
 
Binning et al. (2001) provides an extensive analysis of ecosystem services in the 
Goulburn Broken. The main ecosystem services provided by natural assets for this 
region were reported to be the provision of clean water, the maintenance of liveable 
climates and atmospheres, pollination of crops and native vegetation, control of 
species that could become pests and the fulfilment of intellectual, cultural and 
spiritual needs. Ecosystem services considered important to the Murrindindi Shire and 
particularly for RRD are: 
•  Aesthetics or visual and amenity quality (includes pest plants and animal, 
ridgeline appearance, agriculture and rural land conflict); 
•  Biodiversity (includes aspects such as quantity and quality of flora and fauna 
and management of pest animals and plants); 
•  Water quality (includes management of sediment and nutrients); and 
•  Soil quality (erosion and salinity management). 
 
Whilst the ecosystem services of the region are a major attractor to the rural 
residential developers, development is also having an impact on the supply of these 
services. The nature of the impact could be positive or negative. The direction of the 
impact tends to be a function of the current land condition (which is influenced by 
past land management decisions) and the nature of the proposed development.  In the 
Murrindindi it is estimated that the impact of development on ecosystem services is 
most likely to be negative.  
 
The GBCMA (2003) report that even before development, land management is 
resulting in a decline in ecosystem services. For the GBC, about 70% or 1.7 million 
ha of native vegetation has been cleared since European settlement. The GBCMA also 
report that a vast amount of the remaining vegetation on private land is of poor quality 
(limited diversity, lack of understorey, lack of ground litter etc) and 98% of the 
remaining patches of vegetation are less than 1 ha. The GBCMA has also identified 
declining water quality as a major problem for the catchment. For example, the GBC 
contributes 33% of the Murray River water flow above the Murrumbidgee, but 58% 
of the turbidity (GBCMA 2003). 
 
RRD does not necessarily have a negative impact on ecosystem services, in fact 
changing land use from agriculture to rural lifestyle blocks could improve the land 
management or reduce the agricultural intensity of the land. For example the 
Commonwealth Department for Environment and Heritage noted that “because of 
their off-farm income, hobby farmers [lifestyle farms] often could afford to retain 
native vegetation and biodiversity and are [more] likely to enter into conservation 
agreements” (The Australian Industry Commission 1998). Positive effects of RRD are 
presented further in Table 1.  
 Of course the impact from rural residential development could also be negative. 
Negative impacts could occur from short term, direct and site specific impacts such as 
construction or indirectly and in an ongoing basis from residual changes such as 
increased water run off from paved surfaces or the impact on vegetation from more 
intensive land use (for example intensive hobby activities such as horses) or generally 
poor land management. Individual impacts from RRD could also impact on broader 
ecosystem services supply. For example, poorly sited development could interrupt 
habitat corridors or preclude future improved management (Table 1). That is, there 
could be cumulative and threshold impacts from individual actions. 
 
The current reduced levels of ecosystem services that result from a history of poor 
land management along with the potentially negative impacts on land from 
development, lead to the conclusion that development is likely to also have a negative 
effect on the provision of ecosystem services in the Murrindindi Shire. This is 
particularly the case as it is believed that the development will lead to increasingly 
fragmented landscapes. Despite what the Australian Industry Commission report, it is 
believed that many RRD landholders do conduct some agricultural activities on their 
property and tend to do so with low land management capacity and skills. 
 




Rural lifestylists with less or no stock result in less 
production pressure on the land 
Degraded land rehabilitated 
Rural lifestylists may have a greater interest, time 
and finance to revegetate land with  native 
vegetation 
Revegetation of cleared land 
Smaller parcels of land and increased financial and 
time capacity to manage pests 
Improved pest and weed control 
Improved land management that results in 
improved groundcover  and vegetation of riparian 
zones and stream banks 
Improved water quality. 
Off farm income and new residents   Increased income in the local community, 
strengthened local community spirit and 
facilities. Increased investment 
maintaining local supplier viability 


















Increased property values  Significant capital gains to existing 
landholders 
Poor land management – unsustainable stocking 
rates and poor pest control 
Increased land degradation 
Clearing of native vegetation  - may be sustainable 
at site level but not at the landscape scale (increase 
fragmentation) 
Habitat destruction and fragmentation 
Increased roads and driveways  Soil disturbance and concentrated runoff,  
particularly on steep slop 
Increased paved surfaces  Increased and concentrated water runoff 
Degraded pasture leading to increased sediment in 
runoff. Increased fertilizer and sewerage resulting 
in increased nutrients. 
Water quality decline  
Cumulative individual water harvesting  Water quantity decline 
Increased small blocks  Loss of agricultural land and Conflict 


















Increase in property value   May prohibit the expansion of 
commercial farms Note: Developed with reference to Habitat Planning 2003 and from discussions with Murrindindi Shire 
Council Planners. 
 
3. The conceptual framework  
3.1 Why are ecosystem services undersupplied and declining? 
Historically ecosystem services have been freely and widely available. However, their 
significance is not recognised in our current frameworks for signalling information 
and incentives. For example, whilst there is no shortage of markets for goods such as 
clean water or apples; the services underpinning the production of these goods (water 
purification and pollination) are essentially free in current market operation (Salzman 
et al. 2003).With no market for these services, those who produce ecosystem services 
are not rewarded for the benefits that they provide, whilst those who damage these 
services do so without bearing the cost that they impose on others (Murtough et al. 
2002). Because of the ‘free’ nature of these goods, the level of provision is generally 
less than what is socially desirable and often in decline. 
 
When markets do not efficiently allocate resources, market failure is said to occur. 
There are a range of market failures likely to contribute to poor ecosystem service 
production. The key market failure generally responsible for the undersupply of 
ecosystem services is an inadequate property right structure. A lack of fully defined 
and allocated property rights then results in inadequate information to support 
ecosystem service production (Murtough et al. 2002; Wills 1997).  
 
Property rights do not necessarily relate to the possession of a physical resource but 
rather to the potential benefit stream from the resource; both in isolation and when 
used in combination with other resources (Bromley 1991; Kasper 1998). Property 
rights must be excludable, divisible (in space and scope) and transferable to be 
effective (Kasper 1998). Whitten and Bennett (2005) describe these attributes further 
as: 
1.  Excludability allows the owner to prevent others from consuming the outputs 
from the good and relies on the practicality of identifying and stopping 
potential consumers; 
2.  Divisibility is the ability to separate the bundle of property rights in space and 
scope. Divisibility allows the owner of the property right to manage sub 
components of the resource separately or to divide up and sell off excess 
resources; and 
3.  Transferability grants the ability to sell the property rights to others. This 
feature also requires that property rights can be functionally transferred.  
 
3.2 The current management of ecosystem services with RRD 
In theory, the supply problems for goods arising from market failure may be remedied 
through some level of government intervention (Murtough et al. 2002). The nature of 
government intervention is commonly either; 
•  Facilitative, where measures are designed to improve the flow of information 
and corresponding signals and incentives. This may involve the reform of 
property rights but does not involve direct incentive payments to landowners;  
•  Market based or financial, where measures are designed to directly alter the 
structure of pay-offs to land managers; or  •  Regulatory, where non-voluntary measures are designed to compel 
management change using the coercive powers of government.    
 
Regional sustainability 
In the GBC and the Murrindindi Shire, there are already a number of policies and 
plans in place that regulate for the maintenance of the supply of ecosystem services
1. 
These policies and plans are to be followed regardless of whether a landholder is 
developing or not. With the recognition that simply maintaining the current level of 
ecosystem services does not align with community values and objectives (the current 
and future community actually desire a higher than current level of service provision), 
the GBCMA (2003) has developed a regional catchment strategy (RCS) setting out 
targets for the higher level of supply of specified ecosystem services. Targets in the 
RCS are for water quality, soil quality, pest plants and animals, native vegetation and 
climate. The RCS targets are considered to be those that will enable the region to 
achieve ‘whole of landscape’ or regional sustainability (Figure 2). Whilst these targets 
will need to be achieved by both non-developing and developing landholders alike, 
the remainder of this paper concentrates on a mechanism to aid developing 
landholders achieve regional sustainability targets.   
 
Site sustainability 
Responsibility for the management of the direct impacts of development falls largely 
to the Murrindindi Shire Council. The MSC employ a range of regulatory and 
facilitative processes such as limiting development type and location (zoning and 
overlay provisions) as well as administering a formal development approval process. 
To assist developers in managing the supply of ecosystem services on development 
sites, the Murrindindi Shire have also developed a set of guidelines called the Rural 
Living Development Guidelines (RLDGs) (MSC 2001, 2004). These require all 
development applications to generate a whole farm plan demonstrating ecosystem 
service management activities on the development site. 
 
Regulation of development aims to achieve a development outcome that has no 
negative and un-substitutable third party impacts. In this paper we refer to this as site 
sustainability but this is also referred to as duty of care. For example, an unmitigated 
development might result in direct third party impacts of B in Figure 2 (this might be 
water runoff impacts), however the development might be approved as long as works 
are conducted to manage water runoff such that there are no direct third party effects 
(Back to A in Figure 2). Also significant to site sustainability is that the actions to 
mitigate these impacts are not substitutable with any other action, they have to occur 








                                                 
1Both the regional and shire policies for development and ecosystem services must also 
comply/compliment State policy for the same. The Victorian Native Vegetation management 
framework is one policy that specifically influences the management of native vegetation and also 



































Planning requirements ensure 
developers address this gap to 
achieve site sustainability 
Development A 
 
The management gap between site and regional sustainability 
From an individual site perspective, the planning requirements are an effective means 
to manage the ecosystem services impacts of development and achieve site 
sustainability. Achieving site sustainability will not move the region any closer to 
achieving regional sustainability. This is because site sustainability does not take into 
account important features of the landscape that are needed for regional sustainability 
nor does this mitigate the cumulative, incremental and often residual impacts of 
development at the broader landscape scale. The management gap between regional 
and site sustainability is demonstrated in Figure 3. It is the management of this 
ecosystem service gap that is the focus of the remainder of this paper. 
 






































The management gap 
Development A 
 4. A development offset Market Based Instrument (MBI) to address the 
ecosystem service gap 
The options to address the management gap are more regulation, some form of 
facilitative approach or an incentive based approach that may include a market-based 
instrument (MBI).  
 
Market-based instruments (MBIs) operate through market signals to change the 
incentives faced by landholders, rather than the explicit directives of the comparable 
command and control approach. MBIs have the potential to deliver improved 
ecosystem service outcomes at lower costs than alternative instruments because they: 
1.  Allow flexibility in the way participants choose to respond to the instrument; 
2.  Encourage change amongst those who can achieve change most cheaply, as 
opposed to broadly levelling change requirements on all; and 
3.  Place positive incentives on better land management, as compared to the 
negative incentives evident in regulatory approaches. This then encourages 
innovation in land management. 
 
Significantly, MBIs address the cause of market failure and by changing the market 
forces faced by players, redefine the agenda such that improved environmental 
outcomes are in the landholders own interest (Whitten et al. 2003). 
 
Development offsets require a specified level of performance to be achieved (usually 
couched in the language of ‘no net impact’) but allow flexibility with how this level 
can be achieved. An offset is an action taken offsite to compensate for on-site 
development impacts. Offsets can be conducted by the developer on another site or by 
a landholder contracted and paid by the developer.  Offset works can also occur on 
site, if this is deemed the most cost effective approach. In this case the works are 
called ‘mitigating actions’. 
 
Development offsets have emerged because it is recognised that the cost of reducing 
the environmental impact of development through a specified and inflexible action 
may dramatically increase the cost of compliance for developers without any 
substantial environmental gain. Through development offsets, it is recognised that at 
the same time some developers can only make environmental gains at very high cost 
there are likely to be landholders who can make large environmental gains at 
relatively low cost. Offsets allow the party facing relatively high compliance costs to 
pay another party with lower costs to conduct compensatory actions on their behalf.  
 
In the GBC all landholders must achieve regional sustainability targets. A 
development offset for the Murrindindi provides developers with the choice to either 
achieve targets on site or pay another landholder to conduct equivalent actions off 
site.  
 
Refer to Figure 4 as an example. Here the proposed development has direct and non 
substitutable impacts on third parties (A) (once again this might be water run off 
impacts), in order to proceed, the developer must conduct actions that mitigate these 
impacts. These actions are not substitutable, that is they must occur on site to directly 
mitigate the impact. Once (A) has been fulfilled the developer now has to make 
contributions towards regional sustainability to get development approval (B and C in Figure 4). Because actions B and C are not required to mitigate direct third party 
affects of development, these actions are substitutable. That is, the landholder can 
decide what actions to conduct to fulfil requirements and whether or not these actions 
will be done on or off site, by the developer or by a third party. In this case the 
developer decides that some of the actions can be done on site at low cost (B in Figure 
4). Doing all the regional sustainability actions on site (B and C), however, is too 
expensive for this developer. In this example, the developer looks to find a supplier 
offsite to conduct actions equivalent to C
2. 
 
At the same time, Landholder 1 (who is not developing) also has to take actions to 
contribute to achieving regional sustainability (E). In this example Landholder 1 finds 
conducting works for E can be done at very low cost. In fact, landholder 1 finds that 
they can make a profit by exceeding the targets and selling the oversupply to the 
developer. Landholder 1 produces “C” and sells this credit to the developer and the 
overall regional targets are achieved at a lower cost than a regulation. 
 


































































5. The importance of mechanism design 
One of the best known environmental offset schemes in the international arena is the 
wetland mitigation banking program in the United States. Under certain conditions a 
developer is allowed to substantially alter a wetland if they ensure the protection, 
restoration or enhancement of another wetland. The early operation of the scheme 
indicates that whilst in theory an offset should be a more efficient management option 
compared with regulation, poor design could result in negative environmental 
outcomes. For example, a wetland offset scheme in Maryland gained 122 acres of 
wetland area through mitigation from 1991 to 1996 but lost the wetland function 
equivalent to a loss of 51 acres (Morrison 2004). The question then is “what makes a 
development offset well designed?” 
 
                                                 
2 The supplier could also be another developer who can exceed requirements relatively cheaply. A well designed MBI is one that addresses the reasons why the good is undersupplied 
rket 
esign of the Murrindindi development offset was guided by Murtough et al’s (2002) 
able 2: Desirable property right characteristics 
in the first place, the market failures. In the Murrindindi case (and for most cases of 
undersupply of ecosystem services) the market fails to provide the socially optimal 
level of ecosystem services because the property rights for this good are ill defined 
and poorly allocated. Design of this MBI should therefore focus on specifying and 
allocating property rights as well as facilitating a means by which these can be 
exchanged. Care must also be taken to ensure that the cost of addressing the ma
failures is less than the benefits.  
 
D




1. Clearly defined   tent of the property right is unambiguous.  Nature and ex
2. Verifiable   Use of the property right can be measured at reasonable 
cost. 
3. Enforceable   rship of the property right can be enforced at  Owne
reasonable cost. 
4. Valuable   who are willing to purchase the property  There are parties 
right. 
5. Transferable   ship of the property right can be transferred to  Owner
another party at reasonable cost. 
6. Low scientific  ar relationship with an 
uncertainty 
Use of the property right has a cle
outcome. 
7. Low sovereign risk   ernment decisions are unlikely to significantly  Future gov
reduce the property right’s value. 
Source: Murtough, Aretino




                                                
 and Matsyek (2002) 
 
T
a development offset was investigated for the Murrindindi Shire
3. These issues are 
presented based on the principles of fully defined, allocated and exchangeable 
property rights with discussion disaggregated into the key steps of: 
1.  Defining/measuring what is being exchanged; 
2.  Defining who can demand and supply an offset
3.  Enabling exchange; and 
4.  Supporting and enforcing
 
3 The research only looked at the issues associated with an offset scheme. At the time of writing an 
offset scheme has not been implemented in the Murrindindi Shire. 5.1 Measuring what is being exchanged – the defined, verifiable and scientifically 
certain property right. 
The first component of making a property right fully defined and verifiable involves 
measuring and articulating what you are exchanging. The end result of this is referred 
to as the metric. 
 
Just as in an exchange for wheat, information on quality attributes of the product such 
as moisture and protein content of the grain is required to establish its quality and 
therefore its value, those engaged in an exchange in ecosystem services need to know 
the quality attributes of the good that they are exchanging. For an offset, the quality 
attributes necessary for an exchange are those that indicate that the exchange complies 
with the offset requirements. That is, in order to achieve the required environmental 
outcome, the offset credit must be of equivalent type, have an equivalent landscape 
role, be of equivalent quality, be located such that the offset occurs close to the impact 
or target action and occur in a reasonable time period. The metric must signal these 
attributes to exchanging parties. The metric is THE critical element in evaluating 
alternative actions in providing ecosystem services.   
 
Nine principles
4 have been identified that should be considered in designing a suitable 
metric for any MBI (Whitten et al 2006). These principles are summarised in Table 3. 
Whitten et al (2006) point out that while quantity and quality criteria are critical to 
any metric, the other components should be included according to the MBI and 
associated objectives. Critical factors such as irreversibility may be incorporated 
through filters (for example the NSW BioBanking offset system has a system that 
signals for a permit refusal if irreversibility criteria are triggered). Other factors may 
be incorporated through weighting. For example, distance of improvement from the 
point of damage may be used to weight the scale of the offset required or even 
provide thresholds where offsets may not be appropriate. For many offset schemes, 
the initial metric tends to be developed with high scientific uncertainty. High 
scientific uncertainty means that there is a stronger reliance on case by case 
assessment to achieve outcomes. As science improves the metric, the entire scheme 
can evolve into a rules based trading scheme.  
 
It is important to note that the nine principles presented only refer to a single 
ecosystem services. Where multiple ecosystem services are considered within an 
offset program, consideration needs to be given to a translation between them. For 
example, two different pollutions (eg phosphorous and nitrogen) may be tradable if 




                                                 
4 It is important to note that whilst the principles have been presented separately, in practice they are 
interrelated and need to be considered collectively. Also metrics for ecosystem services are often based 
on proxies (ie can’t trade biodiversity but can get an idea of biodiversity from species – see for 
example the quality indexes approach of the habitat hectares metric developed by Parkes et al ). This 
introduces tradeoffs for metric accuracy, workability and risk. These issues are not discussed any 
further in this paper but should be kept in mind in metric and offset design. Table 3: Principles of metric design 
Design principle  Description 
Quantity/Quality 
(type) 
There are usually a number of measures that deliver different 
messages to landholders and represent subtly different outcomes.  
For example, hectares of native vegetation does not reflect the 
quality of the biological diversity and therefore the resilience, nor 




The relative location of the work can influence the value. A 
management option that provides corridors may have greater value 
to one that has unconnected and scattered vegetation. Spatial 
relationships are also significant to the thresholds in the landscape. 
The crossing of any needs to be carefully considered.  
Relative Change  The goal of policy is usually to improve outcomes from a baseline 
(eg duty of care) rather than to pay for some absolute maximum 
quantity.  Therefore the baseline outcome must be identified and 
estimated.  Second, the measure must be sufficiently robust to 
quantify the improvement from the baseline with confidence.   
Location  The location at which the change occurs can generate different 
values to the community.  This may be particularly important for 
issues such as recreation and amenity.   
Timing  The time of outcome is important in many circumstances, not least 
because of competing investments that generate payments in 
different time periods.  All things equal, earlier outcomes are 
preferred over more distant outcomes.   




Some management changes may be more likely to be successful 
than others.  The key factor in success may be the initial 
establishment or the on-going management.  It is important to 
consider whether the likelihood of success should be considered 
within the metric design or the payment mechanism.   
Risk / certainty 
of outcome 
success 
Even with successful establishment of the management change there 
may be uncertainty about the eventual impacts on outcomes.  
Trading ratios can assist in managing risk. For example requiring 
more than a one for one relationship for offsetting trees will allow 
for the risk that some trees established as offsets will not survive 
Irreversibility  Irreversibility is related to risk.  Where thresholds are anticipated, 
such as extinction of species there is a case for favouring less risky 
actions that achieve change sooner than other options.  Actions with 
irreversible consequences should not be offset. 
Spillover impacts  Spillover impacts are consequences of the specific management 
change elsewhere in the system.  For example, revegetation will also 
reduce base-flows in streams and rivers in the catchment.  The 
potential for and consequences of spillover impacts should be 
carefully considered.  
 
5.2 Who will buy and sell offset rights? 
Once the measurement component of the property right is established, the remaining 
property right characteristics to fulfil are those associated with the ability to easily 
exchange these rights. An exchangeable right is one that is valuable, transferable and enforceable. The first component of this is establishing who can buy and sell offset 
rights.  
 
Who will demand/buy offsets 
Offset buyers are those who are required to provide ecosystem services and can 
legally do this through a third party. Regulatory frameworks are significant to 
establishing who is an offset buyer and therefore creating offset demand. Frameworks 
need to specify what ecosystem services are protected, where these are located and 
who is providing these. Frameworks also need to specify what resource uses and 
activities are permissible under what conditions and where substitution of ecosystem 
services at alternative sites is permissible.  
 
Whilst offsetting may be allowed in the development process, it is not considered to 
be environmentally and politically appropriate to allow offsetting without some 
development impact minimisation and mitigation standard. Regulatory frameworks 
are also needed to specify the level of impact management and mitigation that must 
occur before offsets are allowed. The NSW State Government (NSW EPA 2002) in a 
public concept paper on offsets, “Green offsets for sustainable development” listed 
some guiding principles which could be used to guide the use of offsets in 
development projects: 
 
•  Environmental impacts must be avoided first by using all cost effective 
prevention and mitigation measures on site; 
•  All standard regulatory requirements must still be met; 
•  Offsets must never reward poor environmental performance (only reward 
effort and outcomes above the duty of care); 
•  Offsets must complement other government programs; 
•  Offsets must result in at least a neutral outcome. To achieve a neutral baseline, 
offsets must be based on ratios that account for risk and uncertainty; 
•  Parties must be accountable to ensure offsets achieve their objectives; and 
•  Offsets should only be considered where developments and activities 
demonstrate significant public, social and economic benefits. 
 
In the Murrindindi, the demand for development offsets could primarily be managed 
through the development approval process. Here, a whole farm plan must be 
submitted with a development application and the MSC would be able to determine 
what actions need to be conducted to achieve site and regional sustainability and 
which actions were substitutable and therefore able to be offset.  
 
Who will supply offset credits 
Even if the demand for offsets is created, offsets will not achieve targets unless there 
are landholders that can supply the required on ground actions. In addition, just as 
development offsets can only occur above a certain level of impact mitigation 
compliance, the supply of offset credits should also be bounded by a starting 
minimum. It is inefficient to purchase offset credits for actions that landholders 
should have been doing anyway or are already being paid to do. Landholder duty of 
care is a good baseline from which landholders can supply offset credits to developers.  A baseline duty of care could be incorporated in the metric. Of course the 
problem here is measuring and enforcing this starting point. In the Murrindindi 
example, it is recommended that offset credits can only be supplied once landholders 
have made their on site contribution to regional sustainability (that is, C can only be 
produced in addition to E for the landholder in Figure 4). 
 
5.3 Enabling exchange 
Even with rights surrounding the demand and supply of offsets specified, market 
exchange may be less than optimal without a clear process which supports the value 
of the rights and minimises the transaction costs of exchange. The efficiency gains 
from a market will also be greatest with high market liquidity.  
 
Some components required for the matching up the demand and supply of offset right 
holders has already been discussed in some detail in the previous sections. For 
example, a regulatory framework is needed to inform developers what can be offset 
and a metric is needed to inform market participants that what is supplied is correct 
for the demand. In order to maintain the value of the offset right, verification of the 
demand and supply must also be conducted. Verification could be conducted by an 
independent and accredited auditor or by the scheme administrator. For the 
Murrindindi, it is recommended that verification of offset demand and supply occur 
through site inspections and submission of development and site plans. 
 
Even with these processes in place, the MBI will be no good at achieving objectives if 
the cost of information in the market is prohibitive to participation. The measures to 
structure the market discussed above are fundamental to creating market liquidity 
(high number and variety of exchanges). Additional measures that can influence 
liquidity include disclosing quantities exchanged and prices received, enabling 
brokers to operate in the market and providing banking or borrowing provisions 
(Whitten et al 2006). Each is discussed below. 
 
Information on the potential surpluses that can be made attracts participants to a 
market. This is particularly important for new markets where the high levels of 
uncertainty generate high information costs. Disclosing market exchange information 
such as the nature of the goods exchanged, the quantity and the price can inform 
potential participants of the operation of the market and reduce uncertainty enough for 
them to begin to participate. Allowing brokers to operate in an offset market is 
another way of reducing the transaction costs of an exchange. Brokers can 
significantly reduce search costs by identifying suitable partners for exchange. 
Brokers can further increase liquidity if they can buy and hold offset credits to be sold 
on when a suitable buyer appears.  
 
Offset banking refers to the management of offset credits by one body with the supply 
of offset credits generally occurring before demand. An offset bank has a number of 
benefits. First, with credits supplied before demand, the scientific uncertainty 
associated with matching a supply with a demand is reduced (but not eliminated as 
there will be cases where the supply is not appropriate for a demand). Second, an 
offset bank can be strategic in the generation of offset credit supply. For example, an 
offset bank can secure credits that generate a connected landscape and thus gain 
exponentially beneficial environmental outcomes. Finally, a bank can take some of 
the offset failure risk away from individual landholders which may also assist in the generation of offset supply. It was recommended that a bank, operated by the MSC or 
outsourced be explored for the Murrindindi Shire. Borrowing allows developers to 
generate impacts before offset credits are purchased. This approach is less 
enthusiastically embraced than the banking concept due to the allocation of this risk 
placed entirely on environmental amenity if the developer does not fulfil their 
obligations.  
 
The levels that enable exchange discussed here demonstrate that an offset scheme can 
often begin as a simple scheme with ‘clunky’ processes (assessments and verification 
on a case by case basis) but has the potential to evolve into something far more 
sophisticated. Good processes and rules as well as a science based metric established 
up front will be significant to the transition of the scheme into something streamlined 
and efficient.  
 
5.4 Supporting and enforcing exchange.  
To be effective at achieving environmental outcomes and to maintain the property 
right value, the offset credit must be enforceable both in law and practice over time. A 
good way of establishing a framework to enforce an offset is through the 
establishment of agreed measures and performance standards incorporated into a 
legally binding agreement. On going monitoring will then enable the scheme 
administrator to gauge performance against standards. Failure of a development based 
offset to meet performance standards will place a developer in breach of their 
development conditions and make the developer subject to the penalty provisions of 
the applicable planning legislation.   
 
Offsets do tend to have a high risk of partial failure; because of this, a staged 
enforcement process may be most suitable. Non-performance provisions could 
provide a range of ‘make good’ opportunities ahead of punitive penalties. For 
example, minor infringements resulting from technical or unforseen factors rather 
than deliberately rorting the system per se, may simply require new offsets to make 
good for those that were not provided. An alternative approach may be for offset 
providers to prepare contingency plans in case of offset failure. This process could set 
out triggers that indicate the under performance of an offset. When these triggers are 
hit, contingency plans are activated.  While the key goal of the offset is to manage the 
risks of losing environmental services, the level of penalties for offset failure must be 
considered with reference to the need to encourage market participation (penalties 
perceived as too harsh will discourage participation).  
 
5.5 Administration costs  
Any form of government intervention is only considered effective and efficient if the 
benefits gained are greater than the costs incurred in designing and implementing the 
intervention. Transaction costs of an MBI can be minimised if administration and 
implementation components optimise current institutions and structures (Coggan et al 
2005). For the Murrindindi, transaction costs of the scheme can be minimised by 
nesting the offset process within the current development permit, verification, 
monitoring and enforcement process.   
 
Efficiency considerations for the offset also mean that an important step in the design 
and implementation of the scheme is an ongoing analysis of the likely and actual 
benefits of an offset scheme relative to other policy approaches. Ongoing review of an offset may mean that an offset administrator is required to provide information on 
scheme performance, compliance and benefits as well as costs of implementation and 
ongoing administration.  
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
The demand for RRD living is increasing in many localities and especially for those 
located a commutable distance from large employment centres. The Murrindindi 
Shire is one such locality. Whilst the impact of RRD on ecosystem services could be 
positive or negative, in the Murrindindi case the already low supply levels of 
ecosystem services on RRD properties coupled with inexperienced land managers 
leads us to suggest that the ecosystem service outcome is most likely to be negative.  
 
With a lack of defined and allocated property rights for goods such as ecosystem 
services, current markets do not supply these services at the level that is socially 
optimal. When the market fails, theory suggests that it may be justifiable for 
governments to intervene. In this paper it is noted that there are already many layers 
of government intervention for ecosystem services in the GBC and the Murrindindi 
Shire. That said, however, there is a significant gap between the management of 
impacts on development sites such that there is site sustainability and what is required 
of developers to meet regional sustainability. Due to the efficiency gains that could be 
made through allowing flexibility in meeting regional sustainability targets, we 
investigate the issues associated with managing this gap using a development offset 
MBI. A development offset requires developers to meet regional sustainability targets 
but allows them the flexibility to do this on or offsite. By allowing developers to go 
off site for actions, this type of MBI can see targets achieved at a lower cost then on 
site regulation and creates a demand for the supply of ecosystem services across the 
landscape.  
 
For an MBI to achieve its potential efficiency gains, the MBI must be well designed. 
A well designed MBI is one that addresses the causes of the market failure in the first 
place. In the case of ecosystem services the key market failure is the absence of 
defined and allocated property rights. Using Murtough et al’s (2002) framework of 
seven desirable characteristics for property rights the key steps and issues associated 
with a development offset design are presented. Key steps and issues are those of: 
 
1.  Defining/measuring what is being exchanged; 
2.  Defining who can demand and supply an offset; 
3.  Enabling exchange; and 
4.  Supporting and enforcing exchange. 
 
Stepping through the design issues for a development offset scheme highlights several 
key conclusions: 
•  The metric is critical to ensuring that what is exchanged in an offset is of 
equivalent type (in quantity and quality) to what is impacted by development. 
The metric can also ensure that the supply occurs in a reasonable time frame 
and is located within a reasonable distance to the impact zone. The nine 
principles for metric development presented in this paper also suggest ways to 
manage risk and uncertainty associated with management change effectiveness and outcome success. In this paper we note that some of the metric principles 
can be included in the offset assessment rules. For example, ‘refuse’ 
conditions can occur in the assessment process if an application crosses a 
threshold or has too great spill over effects. We also note that the science 
required for the metric improves over time and with experience. Start up 
metric are often created with high scientific uncertainty with outcomes 
achieved through case by case processes. A metric that continually improves 
and evolves with science can see an offset scheme become much more 
efficient, with trades informed by the metrics and bounded by rules.   
•  The regulation framework is essential to specifying the boundaries within 
which offsets can occur. Through the regulation frameworks, policy makers 
need to specify what ecosystem services are valuable, how much needs to be 
produced and where this production is or needs to occur. The regulatory 
framework also needs to be clear on what impacts are substitutable and can be 
offset and the process that needs to be followed to do this. Through the 
regulatory framework those that can buy and sell offsets becomes clear.  
•  The transaction costs of buyer and seller interaction need to be minimised. 
High market information costs will see low participation in a market, this is 
likely to be the case for a new market such as one for offsets. In this paper we 
provide some suggestions of how the transaction costs could be minimised. 
This includes disclosing information on the characteristics of goods exchanged 
and the price received (to demonstrate the potential surplus available from the 
market), allowing brokers in the market to facilitate exchange and establishing 
banking provisions. While borrowing can also lubricate a market, the high 
risks associated with development and the unequal risk to the environment of 
offset failure leads us to discourage the use of borrowing for the Murrindindi.  
•  An offset MBI has a very strong possibility to evolve into a very sophisticated 
market. The initial design is important for the ability for this to occur. A 
deeper analysis on establishing the means of exchange demonstrates how an 
offset can start small with offsets assessed on a case by case basis and evolve 
into a sophisticated market structure. The initial institutions and structures and 
the management of the initial offset can be very influential over the evolution 
of the instrument.  
•  An offset market will operate and grow only if the value of the rights being 
exchanged is maintained. It is essential that compliance standards are set, 
monitored and enforced. Given the potential for a thin market (at least 
initially), a scheme administrator should explore the potential for flexible and 
staged enforcement.  
•  An MBI is only efficient if the benefits of the scheme outweigh the cost to 
design, implement and administer. Ongoing analysis of the benefits versus the 
costs needs to be conducted by the scheme administrator. It is also wise for an 
offset to be designed such that it optimises the current institutions and 
structures and therefore operates to a minimum transaction cost. 
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